

The President's Daily Brief

4 August 1971

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 August 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Communists appear to have sent reinforcements from North Vietnam into northern Laos to try to counter the offensive by government irregulars on the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 1)

Southbound infiltration from North Vietnam apparently declined to a trickle during July, but Hanoi is ordering increased mobilization of reserve units at home. (Page 2)

Some Viet Cong provincial committees and propaganda agencies now in Cambodia may soon return to South Vietnam. (Page 3)

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
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LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA



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
LAOS

Intercepts indicate that the North Vietnamese have moved a regiment of the 312th Division from North Vietnam to the area east of the Plaine des Jarres. The regiment had been garrisoned in Vinh for the past year. The division's other two regiments returned to Laos last winter and participated in the Communist dry season offensive against the Long Tieng complex.

The movement of this number of North Vietnamese troops into Laos during the rainy season is unusual, and suggests the seriousness with which the Communists view recent gains by Vang Pao's irregulars on the Plaine. In view of the difficulty the Communists have had in operating and supplying front-line units during the monsoon season, it may be some time before they can mount a sustained counteroffensive.

Vang Pao's irregulars, meanwhile, have pushed farther east of the Plaine. Elements of three irregular battalions have taken up positions about six miles from Xieng Khouangville and are now in position to recapture the town if they are ordered to do so.

Infiltration Starts from North Vietnam



	1968 SVN	1969 SVN	1970 SVN, Southern Cambodia, and Southern Laos	1971 SVN, Southern Cambodia, and Southern Laos
JAN	21,000	19,200	13,700	8,200
FEB	18,900	25,000	11,700	7,800
MAR	32,600	17,100	10,600	2,900
APR	38,900	2,300	3,600	2,700
MAY	32,800	1,100	4,900	14,900
JUN	23,500	100	2,100	6,600
JUL	21,800	100	4,100	700
AUG	11,000	600	4,400	3,300
SEP	2,200	600	13,800	10,200
OCT	2,800	4,500	17,100	3,700
NOV	5,200	7,800	18,400	2,600
DEC	30,100	6,200	11,400	2,800

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NORTH VIETNAM

Intercepts from the infiltration corridor through southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia showed less than 700 North Vietnamese infiltrators moving south during July. Nearly 600 of these were en route to the central highlands or northern South Vietnam, and there were fewer than 100 troops heading for Cambodia and southern South Vietnam.

The pattern of southward movements we have observed over the past few months has suggested a seasonal tapering off of the infiltration effort as the rainy season peaked. It is possible that a few groups have recently been moving undetected as a consequence of new Communist restrictions on the use of lower power radios, but the tenor of most intercepts during July indicated that personnel manning the infiltration system were principally engaged in preparing for the upcoming dry season effort rather than in processing infiltration groups.

* * *

A new mobilization directive was sent in July from Premier Pham Van Dong's office to North Vietnamese Government agencies, farms, and commercial establishments. Recipients were told to organize a military reserve unit if they did not already have one, to enlarge existing units, and to begin new training programs in general military doctrine and in small arms and antiaircraft weaponry.

An editorial on the directive appearing in the official Communist Party newspaper on 29 July makes it clear that Hanoi's aim is to improve local defenses and facilitate recruitment and conscription procedures for the regular army. The regime may hope, by hammering on the mobilization theme, to keep popular energies focused on the war effort and related domestic pursuits. It may also be anticipating a higher level of fighting throughout Indochina for which adequate trained manpower must be made available. If Hanoi is planning to increase the pace of combat, we would expect to see additional preparations in the months ahead, including an increased flow of infiltration.

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SOUTH VIETNAM


Since mid-June intercepts from a number of Viet Cong administrative units in Cambodia have referred to plans to return to their former operating areas in South Vietnam and along the border. Included are several Viet Cong provincial administrative commands and propaganda elements that had been in southern South Vietnam and border areas before they were forced to move deep into Cambodia by the allied attacks in April 1970.

These messages support earlier clandestine reports that COSVN has ordered many of its subordinate cadres in Cambodia to return to their former areas in South Vietnam. The reports assert that these cadre are to assist in accelerating programs in subversion, political action, and organization of the party network at the grass roots. Their first task will probably be to assist in organizing Communist opposition to the South Vietnamese elections. A longer term purpose, however, may be to help the Viet Cong prepare for more active political work against the Saigon government as US military units continue to withdraw.


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
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
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
COMMUNIST CHINA



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
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Guinea: There has been no independent evidence to support President Toure's claim, in calling for an emergency meeting yesterday of the UN Security Council, to have intercepted naval messages foreshadowing an imminent foreign attack. Toure has been predicting new attacks ever since the Portuguese-directed seaborne raid last fall, and Conakry's growing concern over its internal weakness is reflected in the intensified purge since mid-June of officials alleged to have been involved in the raid. During the past week, the regime has publicized "confessions" by some of these detainees that they were in league with the Portuguese or West Germans; veiled allusions to an "American network" suggest that an attempt may also be made to implicate the US in Guinea's troubles.

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COMMUNIST CHINA




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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